*Tsunami Losses, Cyclone Ditwah, and Sinhala-Majoritarian Governance: An Eelam Tamil Perspective*
- President Nila
- 2 hours ago
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By Small Drops Balananthini Balasubramaniam

Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami on Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka and situates these losses within the broader structural marginalisation of Eelam Tamils. The political behaviour of Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the NPP/JVP coalition is critically assessed, highlighting the continuity of Sinhala-majoritarian governance. The 2025 Cyclone Ditwah is analysed as an example of state manipulation of disaster reporting and aid, illustrating the persistent structural invisibility of Tamil-majority regions. The study demonstrates why Tamil mistrust of Sinhala-led governance is historically justified, ethically necessary, and politically rational.
1. Introduction
The 2004 tsunami was both a natural and human-made political disaster for the Tamil homeland. Coastal communities were decimated, and recovery was hindered by militarisation, political interference, and structural neglect. Two decades later, despite international acclaim for the NPP/JVP as anti-corruption reformers, their policies continue patterns of Sinhala-majoritarian governance, failing to recognise Tamil nationhood, justice, and structural rights.
*2. The 2004 Tsunami: Human, Economic, and Infrastructure Losses*
The tsunami destroyed entire coastal communities in Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Kalmunai, and Vaharai, resulting in approximately 35,000 deaths in Northern and Eastern Provinces. Thousands of children were orphaned, women-headed households increased, and 50–60% of housing stock was lost. Coastal roads connecting the North to the East (A15, A4) were heavily damaged, disrupting supply chains and economic recovery. Over 90% of small-scale fishing fleets were destroyed, and essential infrastructure suffered approximately 56% economic loss.
Two decades later, vulnerabilities persist in Tamil-majority districts, including lower per-capita development indices, chronic underfunding of housing, education, and healthcare, continued military land occupation, and lack of disaster-resilient infrastructure. Eyewitness accounts indicate that Tamil communities sent 30 lorries of aid to southern districts (Ratnapura) despite political obstruction. For the Tamil homeland, disasters like the tsunami amplify state neglect, reinforcing structural inequality.
*3. Cyclone Ditwah (2025): Political Manipulation of Aid*
While Cyclone Ditwah severely affected Central and Southern Provinces, Northern and Eastern Provinces suffered minimal damage. Nevertheless, the Sinhala-majoritarian government reported “all-island impact”, creating the perception that Tamil-majority areas were equally affected and enabling the government to secure international aid. Aid distribution continues to prioritise Sinhala-majority districts, compelling Tamil communities to organise independent relief efforts to address gaps left by the state.
*4. Political Behaviour of Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the NPP/JVP*
Despite modern branding, the NPP/JVP coalition exhibits continuity with historical Sinhala-majoritarianism. Their policies include:
1. Rejection of Tamil nationhood – Emphasis on “one nation, one people” erases Tamil political identity and undermines federalism and the 13th Amendment.
2. Denial of genocide and accountability – The Mullivaikkal genocide, UNHRC resolutions, and international investigations are dismissed, reinforcing systemic neglect.
3. Militarisation narratives – Military presence in Tamil-majority regions is justified as “national security,” sustaining land occupation and surveillance.
4. Economic extraction – Fisheries expansion, natural resource exploitation, and energy projects proceed without Tamil consent, prioritising Sinhala-majority interests.
In essence, the NPP represents Marxist-framed Sinhala nationalism, structurally analogous to prior governments.
*5. Ethical and Comparative Justification of Tamil Critique*
Eelam Tamil criticism of Sinhala-majoritarian governance is ethically consistent with broader patterns of global post-colonial and religious politics. Analogous examples include:
Global South anti-Western sentiment – Post-colonial states critique Western imperialism; similarly, Eelam Tamils critique the Sinhala-majoritarian state.
Western anti-communism – Historically accepted; Tamil opposition to Sinhala nationalism is analogous, grounded in lived experience and structural violence.
Religious and cultural critique – Hindu critique of Buddhism, Jewish critique of Islam, or Christian critique of other religions is ethically accepted; Tamil critique of Theravada Buddhism is similarly legitimate.
Denying Tamil critique constitutes ethical double standards, privileging dominant communities while suppressing historically oppressed ones. Historical and political justification is clear: the Tamil homeland endured genocide, disappearances, militarisation, and structural marginalisation, making critique necessary for the defence of life, culture, and identity.
*6. Recommendations*
1. Structural Reform – Strengthen and implement the 13th Amendment; devolve political, administrative, and fiscal powers to Northern and Eastern Provinces.
2. Disaster Preparedness – Establish Tamil-majority district disaster councils and develop disaster-resilient infrastructure in neglected areas.
3. Accountability and Justice – Recognise the Mullivaikkal genocide; implement UNHRC recommendations; investigate war-time disappearances and land seizures.
4. Inclusive Economic Development – Obtain Tamil consent for resource projects; prioritise Tamil employment and entrepreneurship.
5. Ethical Recognition and Dialogue – International, regional, and local actors must acknowledge Tamil historical and contemporary grievances and promote comparative justice frameworks.
Eelam Tamil mistrust of Sinhala-led governments is therefore historically justified, ethically grounded, and politically rational. Until structural reform occurs, no Sinhala-led government—NPP, SLPP, UNP—can earn Tamil trust.
*7. References*
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