Sri Lanka’s Fourth Game: Can China and Colombo Outsmart the West Once More?

President Nila
Jun 30
6 min read

I. Contextualising Three Rounds of Diplomatic Evasion

Over the past fifteen years, Sri Lanka has demonstrated a sophisticated capacity for diplomatic appeasement, strategic obfuscation, and deliberate delay. Despite persistent efforts by Western powers and India to enforce accountability, advance human rights, and restrict China’s growing influence, Sri Lanka has consistently outmanoeuvred these attempts on the international stage (Amnesty International, 2017; UN OHCHR Reports, 2015–2025).

The first round, concluding in 2009, saw the termination of Sri Lanka’s protracted civil war, marked by widespread allegations of mass atrocities and gross human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2009). India provided critical military support during this period, whereas Western states largely adopted a passive stance, focusing on post-conflict diplomacy without demanding accountability (Rajan, 2010). The Sri Lankan government capitalised on its victory to consolidate Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony domestically, marginalising Tamil populations and reinforcing ethno-nationalist narratives (de Silva, 2011).

In the second round (2015), the emergence of the Western-leaning Yahapalana administration generated international optimism. This government pledged genuine reconciliation and transitional justice, culminating in formal commitments at the Geneva Human Rights Council (UNHRC, 2015). However, these commitments were ultimately abandoned, undermined by political instability and lack of domestic will (Smith, 2017). India publicly endorsed this process, seeking regional stability, while China maintained a low profile, quietly reasserting its influence amidst Sri Lanka’s 2018 political crisis (Chen, 2019).

The third round (2020–2022) witnessed the return of the Rajapaksa family to power amid widespread popular unrest epitomised by the Aragalaya protests and an unprecedented economic crisis (Daily FT, 2021). Despite mounting pressures, accountability for past abuses was deftly avoided, with the government simultaneously negotiating with India and China to secure strategic and economic benefits. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement was secured with nominal reforms, while China expanded its strategic footprint through control of the Hambantota Port and Colombo Port City developments (Mendis, 2022).

As the fourth round commences in 2025, marked by the visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, the international community faces a critical juncture: will this visit signal substantive progress or yet another chapter in Sri Lanka’s enduring diplomatic theatre?

II. Volker Türk’s Visit: Innovations and Continuities

The 2025 visit by Volker Türk represents a landmark event, marked notably by his historic first-ever visit to the Chemmani mass grave site—where Tamil civilians are alleged to have been summarily executed and interred en masse (OHCHR, 2025). This gesture signals a potential shift towards confronting the legacy of wartime atrocities.

Furthermore, the visit brought explicit recognition of ongoing torture and surveillance practices, which persist despite the formal cessation of hostilities (OHCHR, 2025). Türk’s public calls for the repeal of repressive legislation, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and the Online Safety Act, constitute direct challenges to the legal frameworks enabling systemic state repression (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

Crucially, the High Commissioner’s framing emphasised justice and reparations for victims across Tamil, Sinhalese, and Muslim communities alike, subtly advancing a cross-communal understanding of accountability beyond narrow ethnic confines (OHCHR, 2025).

However, the visit also perpetuated several enduring patterns. Despite commendations of the government’s ‘momentum’ and ‘openness,’ there remains a reliance on domestic accountability mechanisms that have historically failed to deliver justice or gain victims’ trust (International Crisis Group, 2023). The continued hope for a “nationally owned” process contrasts sharply with widespread scepticism among civil society and survivors regarding its credibility (Tamil Centre for Human Rights, 2024).

Notably, there was a conspicuous absence of binding timelines, sanctions, or enforceable mandates, underscoring the risk that this visit may represent a further episode of diplomatic delay rather than decisive action (Amnesty International, 2025).

III. The Indian Ocean Strategic Landscape: China and Sri Lanka’s Quiet Ascendancy

While the United Nations articulates concerns over human rights, China is methodically consolidating its influence in Sri Lanka and the wider Indian Ocean region.

The Hambantota Port, leased to China for ninety-nine years, and the Colombo Port City, emerging as a major financial and logistical hub under significant Chinese influence, are emblematic of this growing footprint (Ranaweera, 2023). China’s extensive debt diplomacy has deepened Sri Lanka’s financial dependence, translating into sustained geopolitical leverage (Financial Times, 2024).

Strategically, China’s Indian Ocean policy aims to secure vital maritime corridors stretching from the Middle East to the Pacific Ocean, effectively counterbalancing the US–India–Australia–Japan Quadrilateral alliance (Kumar, 2022). China’s doctrine of non-interference—eschewing demands for political reform or human rights improvements in exchange for loyalty and debt repayment—provides an alternative to Western conditionalities (Zhang, 2021).

Sri Lanka’s diplomatic posture skilfully balances these dynamics. The government leverages Chinese and Indian interests against each other, maximising benefits while maintaining a facade of official neutrality (Jayasinghe, 2024). Western diplomatic visits are tactically employed to sustain a veneer of international legitimacy despite ongoing abuses (OHCHR, 2025).

IV. India and the West: Strategic Displacement and Missed Opportunities

Despite its geographic proximity and cultural affinities, India remains marginalised in strategic deliberations over Sri Lanka’s future. The political pressures emanating from Tamil Nadu are often disregarded by central authorities, reflecting a broader pattern of inconsistency and at times complicity, particularly notable during the 1987 Indian intervention and the 2009 conclusion of the war (Subramanian, 2018).

Western powers, meanwhile, persist in issuing declarations and accumulating reports without substantive diplomatic or coercive follow-through (Chatham House, 2023). Reliance on domestic accountability mechanisms, despite their well-documented failures, continues to undermine prospects for genuine justice (International Crisis Group, 2023).

If the fourth round of engagement concludes in familiar fashion—marked by unfulfilled promises rather than meaningful prosecutions—then Sri Lanka and China will have secured another significant geopolitical victory. Conversely, India and the West will suffer erosion of credibility and strategic influence within the Indian Ocean basin (Mohan, 2025).

V. Stakes beyond Human Rights

The contest for Sri Lanka’s future transcends normative concerns around human rights, extending into realms of global strategic significance.

Control over critical maritime trade routes underpins global economic flows, making Sri Lanka’s strategic position pivotal. Moreover, the success of the Sino-Sri Lankan model—merging repression with diplomatic engagement—threatens to become a hegemonic template for other authoritarian regimes seeking to evade accountability (Freedom House, 2024).

Most gravely, the fate of the Eelam Tamil population hangs in the balance. Without verifiable truth, justice, and robust international guarantees, Tamil communities risk systematic erasure from history, collective memory, and territorial claims (Tamil Human Rights Organisation, 2023).

Conclusion: Volker Türk’s Visit as a Crucible of International Resolve

The 2025 visit by Volker Türk offers a litmus test for the international community’s willingness to transcend ritualistic diplomacy and effectuate tangible change. The question remains whether Western powers and India will move beyond passive spectatorship and confront the entrenched politics of evasion and repression.

While the ball lies firmly in the West’s court, Colombo and Beijing are actively preparing their next strategic manoeuvres—potentially towards an inevitable diplomatic checkmate.

References (Indicative)

· Amnesty International (2017). Sri Lanka: Post-War Justice and Accountability.

· Chen, L. (2019). China’s Strategic Interests in South Asia. Journal of Asian Affairs.

· Chatham House (2023). Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean: Strategic Imperatives.

· Daily FT (2021). “Aragalaya and the Sri Lankan Crisis.”

· de Silva, K. M. (2011). Sri Lanka: A History.

· Financial Times (2024). “China’s Debt Diplomacy in Sri Lanka.”

· Freedom House (2024). Authoritarian Resilience and Regional Implications.

· Human Rights Watch (2009). War Crimes in Sri Lanka.

· Human Rights Watch (2024). Repression and Surveillance in Post-War Sri Lanka.

· International Crisis Group (2023). Accountability in Sri Lanka: Challenges and Prospects.

· Jayasinghe, D. (2024). Balancing Powers: Sri Lanka’s Geopolitics. South Asia Review.

· Kumar, R. (2022). The Indian Ocean and China’s Strategic Ambitions.

· Mendis, G. (2022). Sri Lanka’s Economic Crisis and Chinese Influence.

· Mohan, C. R. (2025). India’s Role in South Asia: Missed Opportunities.

· OHCHR (2025). Report on Volker Türk’s Visit to Sri Lanka.

· Rajan, S. (2010). India and the Sri Lankan Conflict.

· Ranaweera, A. (2023). Ports and Power: China in Sri Lanka.

· Smith, J. (2017). Geneva Commitments and their Collapse.

· Subramanian, N. (2018). Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka Relations.

· Tamil Centre for Human Rights (2024). Civil Society Perspectives on Transitional Justice.

· Tamil Human Rights Organisation (2023). Eelam Tamil Futures.

· UNHRC (2015). Sri Lanka Resolution.

· Zhang, W. (2021). China’s Non-Interference Policy.

(Disclaimer: Images are AI generated and are used for representational purposes only)

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