Diplomatic Failures and Strategic Betrayals: A Critical Analysis of Sri Lanka’s Commitments towards the Tamil Question

President Nila
14 hours ago
4 min read

Abstract

This article critically examines the key diplomatic efforts and peace initiatives undertaken between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1985 to 2009. Drawing upon historical records, international agreements, and witness testimonies, it reveals a consistent pattern of diplomatic manipulation and broken commitments by the Sri Lankan state and, at times, by international actors. Furthermore, it evaluates the internal shortcomings of Eelam Tamil diplomacy, particularly the failure to sustain a coherent and strategic international lobbying mechanism. Concluding with policy-oriented recommendations, the article underscores the necessity for a renewed Tamil diplomatic approach grounded in legal frameworks, international advocacy, and intergenerational strategy.

1. Introduction

The protracted ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is one of the most complex post-colonial struggles in South Asia. The Tamil population, especially those advocating for Eelam, have historically pursued both armed resistance and diplomatic negotiation. Despite repeated efforts, every significant peace attempt has collapsed, typically due to breaches by the Sri Lankan state or geopolitical manoeuvring by external actors such as India. This article seeks to contextualise and analyse these failures, offering a chronological and strategic critique.

2. Historical Milestones and Breaches

2.1. The Thimphu Talks (1985)

Hosted in Bhutan under Indian mediation.
Tamil parties, including LTTE, jointly articulated four key principles: recognition of Tamil homeland, nationhood, self-determination, and equal citizenship.
No formal agreement was reached. Talks collapsed due to Sri Lanka’s refusal to accept fundamental Tamil demands.

2.2. Indo-Lanka Accord (29 July 1987)

Signed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayewardene.
Promised North-East merger, introduction of the 13th Amendment (devolution), and disarmament of Tamil militants.
The LTTE was not a signatory.
Violation: North-East merger was later annulled; the 13th Amendment remains largely unimplemented.

2.3. Suthumalai Declaration (4 August 1987)

LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran accepted peace under Indian assurances.
Announced ceasefire in front of a large civilian gathering.
A symbolic gesture of goodwill despite exclusion from formal processes.

2.4. Arrest and Deaths of LTTE Cadres (3 October 1987)

During ceasefire, 13 LTTE cadres including Kumarappa and Pulendran were arrested by Sri Lankan forces.
12 committed suicide using cyanide to avoid humiliation.
Violation: This breached the spirit of peace and trust established days prior.

2.5. Indian Offensive against LTTE (5 October 1987)

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) launched military operations against LTTE.
Violation: India reneged on neutrality, leading to escalated hostilities.

2.6. Premadasa–LTTE Talks (1990)

President Ranasinghe Premadasa initiated direct talks and secretly provided arms to LTTE to expel the IPKF.
Diplomacy was used as a strategic cover.
Conflict resumed after failed negotiations.

2.7. Chandrika Kumaratunga Ceasefire (1995)

A 100-day ceasefire declared.
Sri Lankan military allegedly used this period to prepare for war.
Hostilities resumed violently, particularly in Jaffna.
Violation: Peace was exploited for tactical advantage.

2.8. 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)

Brokered by Norway and co-signed by Sri Lankan government and LTTE.
Internationally recognised.
Violations occurred on both sides, but the state allegedly aided Karuna’s breakaway paramilitary group.
CFA was unilaterally abrogated by the Sri Lankan government in 2008.

2.9. Oslo and Tokyo Talks (2002–2003)

LTTE showed willingness to explore a federal solution.
Denied participation in the Tokyo donor conference.
Violation: Undermined LTTE's diplomatic standing internationally.

3. Patterns of Breach and Diplomatic Misuse

Each peace attempt was either misused for strategic advantage or dismantled through non-compliance. Despite armed capabilities, the LTTE frequently demonstrated willingness to negotiate, but were systematically excluded or deceived. India’s involvement, while initially supportive, ultimately failed to maintain neutrality or enforce compliance.

4. The Core Diplomatic Failure of the Tamil Movement

Despite substantial grassroots support and international diaspora networks, the Tamil movement lacked a sustainable diplomatic infrastructure. Key weaknesses included:
Absence of long-term international lobbying post-2006.
Fragmentation of leadership post-2009.
Minimal engagement with global legal mechanisms (UN, ICC).
Over-reliance on Indian goodwill without enforceable guarantees.

5. Recommendations

Reconstruct Diplomatic Infrastructure: Establish a central Tamil foreign affairs entity incorporating legal, academic, and political expertise.
Diversify Strategic Alliances: Engage with a broader international coalition including EU, AU, ASEAN, and Latin American governments.
Utilise International Legal Avenues: Actively pursue justice via the ICC, UNHRC, and other human rights mechanisms.
Strengthen Narrative Control: Produce well-referenced, factual publications to counter disinformation and assert historical truth.
Empower Youth Diplomats: Train emerging leaders in political science, international law, and multilateral diplomacy.

6. Conclusion

The historical record is unequivocal: Tamil aspirations for peace were repeatedly thwarted through betrayal and broken promises. If the Eelam Tamil people aspire to achieve justice and international legitimacy, they must transition from emotion-based appeals to a strategically coordinated, professional diplomatic mission. Only with such rigour can history evolve into a future with dignity and self-determination.

Key References

Indo-Lanka Accord (29 July 1987)
Suthumalai Declaration (04 August 1987)
Norwegian Peace Initiative & 2002 Ceasefire Agreement
Reports from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (2002–2007)
UN Human Rights Council Resolutions (2012–2023)
Still Counting the Dead – Frances Harrison (2012)
The Cage – Gordon Weiss (2011)
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group
Tamil Guardian, TamilNet Archives
First-hand accounts and diplomatic correspondence from Indian and Sri Lankan officials

Date: 27 May 2025, 19:09

United Kingdom

(Disclaimer: Images are AI generated and are used for representational purposes only)

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